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THIN INCORPORATION: A CONTINUING PROBLEM
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most difficult problems for a corporation which bor-
rows money from its stockholders is an Internal Revenue Service claim
that the corporation is "thinly capitalized." If this claim succeeds, the
purported loans are treated as capital contributions for tax purposes,
with the result that the corporation cannot deduct the "interest" pay-
ments and its repayments of principal are treated as dividends to the
stockholders. Under the "thin corporation" rule, it is immaterial that
the parties created an obligation which has all the legal incidents of a
debt; the obligation is treated as capital regardless, merely because of
the shareholder relationship of the creditor, the ratio of debt to capital,
the use of borrowed funds by the corporation, and the other factors
discussed below. Furthermore, since the government's claim that equity,
rather than debt, has been created may not be asserted for a number of
years, the parties may not become aware of this serious tax problem
until after the notes or other purported debt instruments have been
retired and the damage has been irreparably done. Thus, the importance
of advance planning in this area cannot be overemphasized.
The possibility of this problem now exists in any type of corporate
financing which involves advances from shareholders, whether at time
of incorporation or afterward. The underlying question in all "debt vs.
equity" cases is: Which type of security does the corporation's obliga-
tion most nearly resemble? Although the problem is not uncommon,
it is not expressly covered by any section of the Internal Revenue Code
or the Treasury Regulations.
A. EFFECT OF DEBT RATHER THAN EQUITY
Both the corporation and its stockholders may derive tax benefits
from having stockholder contributions treated as debt rather than
capital. Some of the major tax incentives are as follows:
1. If the transaction is treated as debt, recovery of the investment
will not be treated as a dividend. Repayment of a loan will not usually
create adverse tax consequences, but stock redemption often will.
2. Even if the basis of his debt securities is less than their face
amount, the holder may be eligible for capital gain treatment upon
retirement of the debt, under section 12 32(a) (1) of the Internal
Revenue Code or upon sale or exchange with outside parties.
3. If the venture fails, the holder will be able to claim a bad debt
reduction; however, the stockholder may derive benefits superior to
those of holding indebtedness if he has stock that qualifies under sec-
tion 1244 instead.
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4. The corporation may deduct interest paid or accrued on its in-
debtedness.' Dividends paid would not be deductible. The recipient of
the payment is taxed whether it is interest or dividend, except that
individuals may exclude $100 of dividends received each year2 and
corporations may deduct 85% of dividends received.3
5. Accumulation of the corporation's earnings to repay bona fide
debt will usually be considered to be a reasonable need of the business,
whereas accumulation to redeem stock may create problems with re-
spect to the accumulated earnings tax.4
6. If the purported debt obligations are reclassified as capital con-
tributions and if they are held by the stockholders in substantially the
same proportion as they own stock, they may be treated as a second
class of stock which would prevent the corporation and its stockholders
from electing Subchapter S status.5
In addition to these common situations, various special problems
of debt vs. equity occasionally arise.,
B. HIsToRY
Thin corporation problems arose because of the taxpayer's desire
to derive the maximum tax advantages possible from corporate in-
debtedness, while suffering as few disadvantages as necessary.
Fixed debt obligations place a heavy financial burden upon a
corporation: interest and principal must be paid despite corporate
needs; a weaker financial position is presented; creditors and
lending institutions are reluctant to advance funds to heavily
indebted corporations. In turn, true lenders are not given special
incentives, for they do not customarily participate in manage-
ment nor share in the profits of the borrower.7
The taxpayer often attempted to solve his problem through various
types of "hybrid" securities that contained some of the properties of
both stocks and bonds; his ultimate purpose was to attain debt treat-
ment for tax purposes and still retain some of the characteristics of
equity for business purposes.
There have been numerous changes over the years concerning what
constitutes a "thin" corporation. In 1941, the Fourth Circuit s disallowed
I Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §163 (a).
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §116(a).
3 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §243 (a).
41nt. Rev. Code of 1954, §§531-537. See also: Pelton Steel Casting Co. v.
Comm'r, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1958) ; Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc.
v. Comm'r, 284 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1940).
5 Treas. Reg. §1.1371-1(g) (1967).
6 For a discussion of special problems including stockholder guaranteed loans,
and sales to controlled corporations, see Aarons, Debt v. Equity: Special
Hazards It Setting Up The Corporate Capital Structure, 23 J. Taxation
(1965).
7 Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, 43 MARQ. L. REv. 31
(1959).8 Brown-Rogers-Dixon Co. v. Comm'r, 122 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1941).
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interest on "debenture preferred stock," holding that the title used by
the taxpayers was not conclusive, but the circumstances were; the Court
looked for a default provision, fixed maturity date, and due date, in
determining whether debt or equity existed. In 1946, the Supreme
Court in John Kelley Co. v. Comm'r9 held that no one factor controlled
as to debt or equity, but several lower courts used dictum in the case
to the effect that the relationship between stock investment and debt
structure was highly relevant, and established the test of "debt to
equity" as the major test. The Court had indicated that 4:1 was a
"safe" ratio, but we know now that reliance solely on a low ratio is
anything but safe. In Gooding Amusemnent Co.,1° the Sixth Circuit ap-
peared to view the "intent" of the parties in rejecting a formerly safe
ratio of 1:1. On the other extreme, the Sixth Circuit has held a ratio
of 18,800:1 acceptable."
This constant shifting of perspective concerning the proper test to
apply has led to the categorizing of the periods through 1959.12
Pre-1946: Hybrid Security Era-No one factor was paramount, but
the primary issue was the real intention of the parties. Other factors
which were stressed included variable interest and principal payments,
voting rights, nomenclature, and subordination clauses.
1946-1956: Ratio Era-This was heralded by the Kelley' case.
1956-1959: Search For Substance-In Gooding,'14 interest was again
viewed as a key factor.
The present era is as yet unnamed, but perhaps it could be called
the "Confusion Era."
C. THE TESTS OF DEBT vs. EQUITY
Many different tests have been used by the courts to determine
whether debt or whether equity exists. Some of the more common ones
are: whether the "loans" are proportionate to shareholdings; whether
1hey are subordinated to other debt; whether the terms are such as
those an outside lender would not agree to; whether the business con-
ditions are such that no outside lender would loan money to the busi-
ness; whether repayment is at the risk of the business; the intent of
the parties; and the ratio of debt to equity.
The courts have found various uses for these tests; while one par-
ticular court may find that only one test is controlling, another may
prefer a different test or a combination of tests. The matter is further
complicated by the fact that as general financial conditions change, the
9 326 U.S. 521 (1946).
10 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956).
" Byerlite Corp. v. Williams, 286 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1960).12 Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, 43 MARQ. L. REv. 31, 33
et. seq. (1959).
13 John Kelley Co. v. Comm'r, 326 U.S. 521 (1946).
14 Gooding Amusement Co. v. Comm'r, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956).
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test or tests used by any particular court may also change. Even where
the parties' intent is deemed controlling, the courts are not in con-
sonance as to which qualities indicate what the parties intended.1 5
Perhaps the most arbitrary and controversial test is ratio of debt to
equity: if there is a high ratio of debt to the investment in capital stock,
some, or usually all, stockholder owned debt is considered as equity
investment. The ratio is based on actual rather than book values; the
value of the stock may be based on paid-in capital plus retained earn-
ings, or on arms length sales of the stock., There is now substantial
doubt concerning how low the ratio must be to be safe from attack;
formerly 4:1 was believed safe, but the Gooding17 case held that even
a 1:1 ratio situation was subject to attack as investment rather than
indebtedness.
II. How THE COURTS APPROACH THE PROBLEM
Since, as we have seen, the tests used are not uniform, and the
Internal Revenue Code is no help, it will be necessary to examine the
views of selected courts individually.
A. FIRST CIRCUIT
In Gloucester Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Comm'r," the First Cir-
cuit held that despite a 15:1 debt-equity ratio, an obligation is to be
treated as debt rather than capital where it is not sham, it bears in-
terest which is payable regardless of corporate earnings, it is valid on
its face, and has good prospects of being paid when it becomes due.
This suggests that the First Circuit stresses good faith and intent of
the parties.
However, it has been suggested 9 that the Treasury, in an attempt
to bar interest deductions, at least in the First Circuit, may be using
an older case which barred an interest deduction on registered notes




In Kraft Foods Co. v. Comnmr," Kraft, a subsidiary of National
Dairy with a stated capital of $2,000,000, declared a dividend of $30,-
000,000 in 6% debentures with fixed maturity date and acceleration on
15 For interesting cases relating to a successful claim by the Treasury that the
parties did not intend to make a loan, see Fellinger v. United States, 363 F.2d
826 (6th Cir. 1966) and Hippodrome Building Co., T. C. 'Memo. 1965-25, see
4 RIA TAX COORDINATOR §K-5114.1 in which the editors believe that the former
case is a threat to closely held corporations and to widely held corporations
which sell bond-stock packages to buyers who primarily want the equity
interest.
16 34 A i. JUR. 2d Federal Taxation §7133 (1967).
17 Gooding Amusement Co. v. Comm'r, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956).
's 298 F.2d 183 (1st Cir. 1962).
19 4 RIA TAX COORDINATOR Develop-nents §K-5105.
20 Talbot Mills v. Comm'r, 146 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1944).
21232 F.2d 118 (2nd Cir. 1956). It should be noted that this is one of the few
thin incorporation cases not involving a closely held corporation.
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default, mainly to minimize taxes; the interest rate was later reduced to
4% and on the due date the debentures were replaced by similar 4%
debentures. The Commissioner argued that the debt-equity ratio was
excessive, that a parent-subsidiary relationship was involved, that there
was no intent to create a debt, and that there was only a tax saving
purpose but no business purpose. In a 2-1 decision, the Court allowed
the interest deduction because the taxpayer's intention to create indebted-
ness was clearly manifested since the debentures had the attributes of
debt. The majority found no policy reason to disregard the interest of
the parties; thus, two corporations were allowed to minimize their taxes
merely by showing an intention to create indebtedness, though no busi-
ness purpose was shown.
The theory in the more recent Gilbert2 case is much less clear, with
the three judges expressing separate views. Though all of them found
an intent to create debt, Judge Medina, who wrote the opinion, believed
the controlling test was the "Risk" test: whether there was reasonable
expectation of repayment irrespective of the success or failure of the
venture. He found that six factors must be considered in using the test:
the ratio of debt to equity, presence of tax avoidance motives, agreement
to keep debt proportional to equity investment, use of the funds, whether
outsiders would have made the investment, and lack of reasonable ex-
pectation of repayment.
23
Judge Waterman, in a concurring opinion, found that even where
there is an intent to create debt there are situations in which advances
may not be considered loans.2 4 He believed that two tests were impor-
tant: (1) "Proportionate Holding" test: whether advances were made
in proportion to the equity investments of the parties; and (2) whether
advances had been continuously made without regard to normal creditor
safeguards under the circumstances. The latter is rather similar to Judge
Medina's test. Judge Hand dissented, believing that a finding of nontax
reasons for the transaction is necessary to avoid equity treatment; this
view has been termed the "Business Purpose" test.
Upon remand, the Tax Court again held that the advances did not
qualify as bona fide debts for tax purposes, and supported its view with
"findings of ultimate fact" which were sufficient to satisfy the tests pro-
mulgated by all three Second Circuit judges.2 5 When the case was
appealed again, the Second Circuit, with none of the judges present who
had participated in the previous decision, affirmed.2 6 It was concluded
that no one element was determinative in deciding whether particular
advances should be treated as equity rather than debt, but in this case:
22 Gilbert v. Comm'r, 248 F.2d 399 (2nd Cir. 1957).
23 Id. at 406, 407.
24 Id. at 409, 410.
25 17 T.C.M. 29 (1958).
26 262 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1959).
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(1) there was an attempt to keep advances closely proportionate to
stockholdings, (2) Gilbert knew that the advances might be absorbed
by the corporation's capital requirements, and (3) the advances were
continued after the corporation was obviously in serious financial diffi-
culty and unlikely to repay.
The Second Circuit dealt with this problem more recently in Nasau
Lens Co. v. Cornm'r,2 7 and held that where the owner of a business trans-
ferred the business to a corporation in exchange for all the stock of the
corporation pursuant to an agreement whereby the corporation issued
debenture notes of $150,000 to the stockholder for $100,000 of assets,
the corporation should not be deprived of a discount deduction in its
tax computation, even though the stockholder had no business purpose.
In absence of statutory language or legislative history to the
contrary, the desire to save taxes is not by itself sufficient to use
to disregard the form adopted by the taxpayer, for "the question
for determination is whether what was done, apart from the tax
motive was the thing which the statute intended.28
The court summarized its position:
In short, we have held that non-arm's-length loans by a stock-
holder to a corporation are to be recognized or disregarded for
tax purposes according to the extent to which they comply with
arm's-length standards, not the extent to which the taxpayer has
a business purpose.... There is "no rule which permits the Com-
missioner to dictate what portion of a corporation's operations
should be provided for by equity financing rather than by debt,"
Estate of Miller v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 729, 734 (9th Cir.
1956), so long as the latter can be said to be debt in terms of sub-
stantial economic reality.2 9
After finding whether a debt has in fact been created, the next step
is to determine whether it should be treated as debt for tax purposes.
The court found that this depends on "whether the creation of the debt
had a result similar to the one Congress had in mind when it drafted
the statute involved, or if the intent is left unclear, whether there is a
patent distortion of normal business practice." 30 The standards to be
applied are: (1) There must be an intent to repay, or no debt can exist;
(2) To what extent do the debentures bear a substantial risk of the
enterprise and are tied up with the success of the venture; (3) Whether
they specify a date on which the creditor may demand a definite sum
regardless of profits; (4) Whether the instrument is subordinated to
debts held by outsiders; (5) Debt-Equity ratio; (6) Whether outsiders
would have made similar advances; (7) Very high rate of interest or
27 308 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1962).
28 Id. at 44; citing Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
2 9 Id. at 46.
30 Ibid. For an application of the Court's statement relating to the intent of
Congress, see J. T. Slocomb Co. v. Comm'r, 334 F.2d 269, 275 (2d Cir. 1964).
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discount may indicate a dividend. Tax savings motives may be consid-
ered but are not conclusive. 1
Thus, the Second Circuit presently appears to be searching for the
manifested intent of the parties, and business purpose, or lack of it,
is no more than evidence of what the parties intended.
C. FIFTH CIRCUIT
In Rowan v. United States,32 the Fifth Circuit held that the "true
intent" of the parties controlled, and while the intent is to be garnered
from all the relevant facts and circumstances, the debt-equity ratio was
considered not to be relevant. The court cited Rowan in rejecting the
ratio in Sun Properties v. United States,33 although there was a ratio
of 310:1; in the latter decision, "business purpose" was also rejected."
The court, in United States v. Snyder Brothers Co.,33 found that
where $450,000 book value of partnership assets were transferred to a
corporation which assumed $203,000 of partnership liabilities and gave
the partners $100,000 of par value stock and $140,000 of debentures
which were subordinated to all indebtedness of the corporation, matured
in 20 years, and paid 6% interest, the debentures were not real debts.
It was noted that when all of the circumstances were considered together,
there was little difference the debentures and preferred stock: (1) The
"debt" was between a corporation and its stockholders; (2) The deben-
tures were subordinated; (3) The debentures were extremely long term
(20 years) and unsecured; (4) There was no limitation on the amount
of payment of the dividends and no provision for a sinking fund out
of which payments can be reasonably assured after all other obligations
are paid. The court also emphasized that while subordination alone does
not prevent creation of a debt, and while a stockholder may also be a
creditor of his corporation, both of these occurrances were present in
this case.
In Tomlinson v. 1661 Corp.,3" the Fifth Circuit apparently reaffirmed
the rejection of the debt-equity ratio, although it was also stated that
it was uncertain to what extent the ratio remained a pertinent considera-
tion in the circuit. It was further held that if the corporation needed
money which outsiders would only lend it on terms the corporation
considered "economically unwise," it could borrow funds from its
stockholders without having the debt classified as capital. The court
also limited its earlier stand against subordination; it distinguished this
case, in which the debt was subordinated only to a mortgage, from the
31"In short, a departure from normal business patterns combined with a tax
avoidance motive usually will be sufficient to justify treating the 'loan' as
equity. Either factor alone, however, is not enough." Id. at 47.
32 219 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1955).
33 220 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1955).
34 Id. at 174-175.
35 367 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1966).
36377 F.2d 291, 296, 298-299 (5th Cir. 1967).
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Snyder case, in which the debentures were subordinated to all present
and future indebtedness. Finally, the court concluded that the ultimate
question to be decided is not the intent of the parties, but rather whether
their intent should be recognized for tax purposes; therefore, intent can-
not be the "sole consideration. ' 37
D. SIXTH CIRCUIT
The Sixth Circuit approach appears similar to that of the Fifth.
In Byerlite Corp. v. Williams,38 it was held that the transaction
should be accorded the treatment that the parties intended, and that
business risk is not a useful test because anyone who makes a loan to a
corporation takes a risk. But in Foresun,39 the court found no debt where
there was: (1) "high" ratio of debt to equity (100-1) ; (2) no payment
of principal on the note; and (3) subordination of the note to a new
bank loan; therefore, a transfer of land to the corporation for a note
and cash was a capital contribution even though the grantor owned no
stock in the corporation.
The Sixth Circuit found a "classic" case of capital contributions
disguised as loans in Jones v. Comm'r.40 The taxpayer inherited stock
in a family corporation and made advances to help it pay expenses, re-
ceiving in exchange unsecured notes which were subordinated to all
of the corporation's other debts. All but one note bore no interest (and
none was paid on that one), none had a maturity date, and the taxpayer,
most significantly, expected repayment from the proceeds of a possible
sale of the corporation's assets. The attempted bad debt deduction was
disallowed.
E. SEVENTH CIRCUIT
In Sarkes Tarzian v. United States,4' the Seventh Circuit indicated
that the primary consideration was the intent of the parties under all
of the relevant circumstances. Thus, the ratio test was impliedly diluted.
In 1959, several considerations were combined to defeat the tax-
payer's attempt to receive debt treatment. The court, in Arlington Park
Jockey Club v. Sauber,42 noted that various factors had been stressed
37 Id. at 299. The Court cited the eleven factors in determination of debt or
equity of 0. H. Kruse Grain & Milling Co. v. Comm'r, 279 F.2d 123, 125 (9th
Cir. 1960) with apparent approval: (1) Names given to the certificates of
obligation; (2) presence or absence of maturity date; (3) source of pay-
ments; (4) right to enforce payment of principal and interest; (5) participa-
tion in management; (6) status equal to or inferior to that of regular corpor-
ate creditors; (7) intent of the parties; (8) thin or adequate capitalization;
(9) identity of interest between creditors and stockholder; (10) payment
of interest only out of "dividend" money; (11) ability of the corporation to
obtain loans from outside landing institutions. Other criteria are also possible.
Id. at 296.
.3 286 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1960).
39 Foresun, Inc. v. Comm'r, 348 F.2d 1006 (6th Cir. 1965).
40 357 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1966).
41240 F.2d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 1957).
42 262 F.2d 902 (7th Cir. 1959).
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in determining whether advances to closely held corporations are loans
for tax purposes: (1) Debt-equity ratio; (2) Use to which the funds
were put; (3) Whether outside investors would make such investments;
and (4) Lack of reasonable expectation of repayment. The advances
were found to be contributions to capital because: (1) They were at
the risk of the venture, and subordinate to the claims of creditors; (2)
They were in direct proportion to stockholder ownership, and this gives
rise to strong inference of capital investment; and (3) There was no
fixed maturity date.
The Seventh Circuit dealt with the problem more recently in the
Charter Wire4 3 case. There, stockholders in the defendant corporation
had originally begun as a partnership, but had subsequently transferred
the partnership assets to defendant for book value ($66,805.74) in
notes, and each former partner purchased stock, aggragating $680, in
exact proportion to the notes he held; when a new executive was hired,
he was allowed to purchase stock, but he was also required to loan money
to the corporation. The notes were subordinated to a bank held debt, and
interest was paid regularly on the notes except during a three month
period in which the corporation had a tight cash position. The "loans"
were held to constitute capital contribution, so that its "interest" pay-
ments were treated as dividends and were not deductible.
The court found a strong inference prevailed that the obligations
were capital, because the stockholders always held their notes in direct
proportion to their equity. Another factor which weighed in favor of
the United States was that the assets for which the notes were exchanged
were essential to the conduct of the corporation's business. Although
the court agreed that the taxpayer had a very favorable debt-equity ratio,
it cited approvingly a First Circuit" case stating that the absence of an
unfavorable ratio was not controlling. The Seventh Circuit also agreed
with the First Circuit decision 45 that since expectation of payment at
maturity is a good indication of existance of debt, a sinking fund should
be established to provide for retirement of debt obligations.
F. NINTH CIRCUIT
As early as 1952,46 the Ninth Circuit expounded the view that the
validity of debt depended on the intent of the parties, and that, for this
purpose, evidence of business purpose was more important than the
ratio. This view concerning the debt-equity was reaffirmed in Miller's
Estate v. Conm'r,47 in 1956.
In Lundgren v. Comrn'r,4 the court stated that even if there had
43 Charter Wise, Inc. v. United States, 309 F.2d 878 (7th Cir. 1962).
44 Brake & Electric Sales Corp. v. United States, 287 F.2d 426 (1st Cir. 1961).
45 Gloucester Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Comm'r, 298 F.2d 183 (1st Cir. 1961).
46 Earle v. W. J. Jones & Son, Inc., 200 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1952).
47 239 F.2d 729, 734 (9th Cir. 1956).
48 Lundgren v. Comm'r, 376 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1967).
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been no equity and the advances were entirely at the risk of the business,
the loan could still be valid. It was evidenced by promisory notes bearing
interest which were subordinated to an SBA loan but not to any other
debt; also, Lundgren's voting power in the corporation had not been
changed. The obligations were deemed to be loans, and the fact that out-
side sources would not have made advances and that the advances were
partially subordinated was held not, of themselves, controlling.
The Ninth Circuit recently held for the taxpayers in a rather unusual
case. 9 Three partners with a solid reputation and connections in the
logging business sold the partnership assets to a new corporation; each
partner purchased $1,500 worth of stock and the corporation borrowed
$240,000 to buy the assets, the partners having guaranteed the note.
Apparently, one of the motives for incorporating was to get a new tax
basis on the machinery and to begin depreciating it again. Internal
Revenue, claiming the transaction should be a tax free exchange, dis-
allowed the stepped-up depreciation basis, and held that the payment
for the assets with money borrowed from the bank was a constructive
dividend to the stockholders (formerly partners). The court found that
because the stockholders were well known men of integrity in the log-
ging business, their established position in the industry was of sufficient
value to the corporation to prevent the venture from being thinly capital-
ized. This holding should be of little consolation to stockholders who
seek to avoid attack by guaranteeing loans rather than actually loaning
the money themselves, for the court pointed out that when taxpayers
use pure gimmicks of form to shield the real essence of the transaction,
the transaction will be recast for tax purposes.
III. CONCLUSION
We have seen that capitalizing a corporation with debt obligations
instead of stock is usually advantageous to both the corporation and the
stockholder, for the reasons discussed above. It may be especially
tempting for persons about to incorporate a business to attempt to do
so partly by issuing debt obligations. If the classification of debt is not
challenged, the incorporators may derive not only a tax free incorpora-
tion5" but also all the advantages of receiving some debt instruments
rather than only stock certificates. While that result is desirable, there
is a risk that the debt obligations will be treated as capital contributions
if their duration is long5' (in which case the tax free incorporation is
still preserved), or as "other property" 52 if their duration is not suffi-
49 Murphy Logging Co. v. United States, 378 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1967).
50 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §351.
51 One of the circumstances that the Fifth Circuit found weighing against debt
treatment was that the debentures were of extremely long duration (20 years).
United States v. Snyder Bros. Co., 367 F2d 980 (5th Cir. 1966).
52 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §351 (b), Also see Turner v. Comm'r, 20 T.C.M. 468
(1961), holding that a relatively short term note is not of sufficient duration
to be a "security" under §351.
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ciently long for them to be classified as "securities." If they are neither
stock nor securities, the incorporation is partially taxable. 53
In addition to the possible loss of tax free incorporation, the tax-
payers also risk their opportunities for Subchapter S status if they
classify advances to the corporation as loans. If the government is suc-
cessful in having the advances reclassified as capital contribution, there
is great risk that the reclassified equity will be held to constitute a second
class of stock, unless it is held in substantially the same proportion as
the "creditor's" stockholdings ;54 if a corporation has more than one
class of stock, it may not elect Subchapter S status.5 5 While proportion-
ate "debt" to stockholdings will save Subchapter S treatment, it will
almost certainly result in all advances by stockholders being reclassified
as capital contributions. This anomoly leaves the taxpayer in a seemingly
irreconcilable position, and is of great concern at the planning level.
The debt-equity enigma has had a stormy and confusing existence.
During the period of hybrid securities, the courts used a simple ap-
proach: the form of the instrument determined whether it was stock or
indebtedness. This was followed by the prominence of the ratio of debt
to equity as the sole test.5 6 Since the end of the ratio test as the ultimate
test,57 we have been in a never-never land. The courts have wrestled with
theories relating to proportionate holdings of debt and stock, intent of
the parties, and risk; yet no real answer has emerged.
When a stockholder holds debt and stock proportionately, his claim
that debt treatment should be accorded is weakened because the ad-
vances appear to be stock. Presently, proportionate holdings is a factor
that the courts will consider, but it is not the sole criterion. Unfortu-
nately for the taxpayer, disproportionate holding of debt and equity
does not guarantee debt treatment. 58
"Intent" and "risk" are also factors a court may consider. In Good-
ing,5 9 advances were held to be equity where they had long since matured
but no payment had been made; thus the taxpayer did not act as a
creditor would, because he took no steps to enforce repayment. The
Second Circuit, in the Nasau Lens case,60 held that intent to repay is
necessary in order to establish indebtedness; also, the court should
consider whether repayment is tied to the success of the business, and is,
therefore, at the risk of the business.
It is easily seen that there is a great lack of uniformity among the
53 nt. Rev. Code of 1954, §§351 (a), (b).
5' Treas. Reg. §1.13 71-1 (g) (1967).
T551nt. Rev. Code of 1954, §1371 (a) (4).
56 John Kelley Co. v. Comm'r, 326 U.S. 521 (1946).
.5 Rowan v. United States, 219 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1955).58 Reed v. Comm'r, 242 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1957).
59 Gooding Amusement Co. v. Comm'r, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956).
60 Nasau Lens Co. v. Comm'r, 308 F.2d 39, 47 (2d Cir. 1962). Also see Judge
-Medina's opinion in Gilbert v. Comm'r, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957).
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circuits. 61 The views of individual jurisdictions range from rather liberal
(from the taxpayer's point of view) to highly government-oriented.
Perhaps most confusing is the propensity of courts which pay lip service
to the same "test" to apply different criteria, or the same criteria in
different ways, in reaching their conclusions.
Probably the most important step the taxpayer can take toward con-
vincing a court that the advances he made should be accorded debt
status, is that either the indebtedness was repaid in accordance with its
terms, or that there is a date set for its reitrement in the formal written
agreement, interest is being periodically paid in the meantime, and re-
payment is being assured by a trusteed sinking fund to which payments
are made by the corporation irrespective of corporate earnings. While
there is a great difference of opinion concerning which tests should be
given the most weight, three generalities appear to have emerged from
the maze of court decisions: (1) Although many circuits purport to dis-
credit the debt-equity ratio, most of them at least consider the ratio to
be one of the important factors in determining the intent of the parties;
thus, the ratio is far from dead. (2) While the parties may be able to
subordinate stockholder held obligations to some outside debt, a combin-
ation of complete subordination and a high debt-equity ratio would
probably prove fatal to a claim of indebtedness; the importance of
subordination has been adequately demonstrated in the Fifth Circuit,
where completely subordinated debentures were found to be equity
2
while advances subordinated only to a mortgage were allowed to be
treated as indebtedness.6 3 (3) There is some authority for the proposi-
tion that business purpose is no longer required, although it is one of
the things a court will probably consider*7 While these are the most im-
portant criteria, the court may also consider the name given to the cer-
tificates of obligation, whether dividend payments would be restricted
if interest payments become in arrears, and whether the corporation
could have obtained loans from an outside lending institution. Even
casting the transaction as a guarantee of a bank loan rather than an ac-
tual loan by the stockholder is not likely to help,65 if the court's "tests"
are not met.
At the planning stage, only one other suggestion can be made to the
taxpayer. While no ratio can be considered "safe" any longer, a very
low ratio of debt to equity may yield considerable tax benefits while
61 Hickman, The Thin Corporation: Another Look at an Old Disease, 44 Taxes
883, 885 (1966). The author reported that between 1963 and early 1966, the
issue of thinness had been dealt with by: Tax Court, 43 times (taxpayers
won fifteen) ; Court of Claims, once (taxpayer lost) ; Federal District Courts,
24 times (taxpayers won fifteen); Courts of Appeal (taxpayers won only
two of thirteen decisions).
62 United States v. Snyder Bros. Co., 367 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1966).
63 Tomlinson v. 1661 Corp., 377 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1967).
64 Nasau Lens Co. v. Comm'r, 308 F.2d 39, 47 (2d Cir. 1962).
65 Murphy Logging Co. v. United States, 378 F.2d 222, 224 (9th Cir. 1967).
1968]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
keeping the possibility of challenge by the government comparatively
low. In other words, having the benefit of part of the investment being
treated as debt rather than equity is better than having no such benefit
at all.
The only thing which is now clear is that the various courts have
created a great patchwork of rules that can best be untangled by Con-
gress. In reviewing the myriad of tests used, one can hardly help but
think:
Perhaps the judicial ruminations can be summarized, without
disrespect or loss of clarity, by saying that they come down to a
standard that becomes instinctive with the experienced lawyer
in this, as in many other areas: the "pig" theory, so named after
the Wall Street adage that "You can make money being a bull,
and you can make money being a bear; but you can't make money
being a pig.'66
MARTIN J. KURZER
66 BITKER AND EuSTIcE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS, §4.04 (2d Ed. 1966).
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